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in the cognitive sciences about the power of intuition.
The risk—and the irony—is that removing felt-
sense and aesthetics from design involves more than 
making design thinkers think like managers. It will 
make them think like managers of the past. 
1 Karin Lindgaard and Heico Wesselius, “Once More with Feeling: 
Design Thinking and Embodied Cognition,” She Ji: The Journal 
of Design, Economics, and Innovation 3, no. 2 (2017): 83–92, DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sheji.2017.05.004.
2 See, for example: Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, The 
Knowledge Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the 
Dynamics of Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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Not working in the domain of design, I had no 
previous understanding of design thinking before 
reading Karin Lindgaard and Heico Wesselius’ article, 
“Once More with Feeling: Design Thinking and Em-
bodied Cognition.”1 Interestingly, and perhaps tell-
ingly, Lindgaard and Wesselius do not appear to offer 
a definition. After studying accounts on Wikipedia 
and other top Google hits, I concluded that design 
thinking is more mystical than Tibetan Buddhism. 
Sometimes, design thinking is defined negatively, as 
not being problem-oriented thinking nor scientific 
reasoning. When defined positively, design thinking 
is described as solution-oriented, action-oriented, and 
needs based, and is associated with creative action, de-
signer sensibility, technological feasibility, alternative 
solutions, emotional satisfaction, and constructive 
future results. While trying to formulate a coherent 
account, I wondered what alternative accounts of the 
design process exist, or whether design thinking is 
simply whatever designers do.
From this exercise, I could see why Lindgaard 
and Wesselius noted early on that the construct is 
often not well understood by the public or by those 
who practice it. Furthermore, if the construct is based 
largely on “anecdotal evidence” and covers domains 
as broad as “a cognitive style,” “a general theory of 
design,” and “an organizational resource,”2 I can 
further see why it might be struggling to gain accep-
tance and recognition. Perhaps my overly rigid scien-
tific orientation is showing, but what appears to be a 
relatively vague construct might benefit from defini-
tion and refinement.
Alternatively, maybe I should lighten up and 
adopt a more intuitive and mystical perspective. 
Perhaps vagueness and intuitiveness constitute 
fundamental strengths of design thinking—what it 
offers would be lost with greater precision. If so, then 
“define design thinking” could be a Zen koan for 
achieving design enlightenment.
In their article, Lindgaard and Wesselius doc-
ument the long-standing and continuing influence 
of cognitive science, not only on design thinking, 
but on design in general. Reading between the lines, 
the design community appears to have turned to 
cognitive science for two general reasons. First, 
cognitive science offers scientific explanations for 
understanding the design process in terms of cogni-
tive and affective mechanisms (description). Second, 
cognitive science offers evidence-based principles for 
teaching and implementing optimal design practices 
(prescription).
Throughout their article, Lindgaard and Wesse-
lius document the contributions of specific cognitive 
science traditions, beginning with European Gestalt 
Psychology and the subsequent Cognitive Revolution. 
From the perspective of Gestalt Psychology, cognition 
and perception are organized in holistic patterns 
of experience that include perception and action as 
parts. Drawing inspiration from Arnheim’s classic Ge-
stalt work on visual thinking,3 design theorists have 
proposed that design originates in broad experiential 
patterns, which integrate perception, action, and 
other elements of conscious experience, including 
affect. Alternatively, from the perspective of the cog-
nitive revolution, the design process has been viewed 
as the representation, manipulation, and execution 
of abstract symbolic structures, such as those in logic, 
language, and computer programming.4 Whereas the 
Gestalt approach suggests that design originates in 
holistic sensory-motor-affective experience, the classic 
cognitive approach suggests that design originates in 
symbol manipulation and linguistic processes.
Of primary interest to Lindgaard and Wesselius 
are recent developments in cognitive science asso-
ciated with conceptual metaphor, embodied cogni-
tion, and emotion. Similar to Gestalt psychology and 
classic cognition, these approaches potentially offer 
insights into how the design process works, along 
with new principles for optimizing design practice 
and learning. Much like Arnheim’s Gestalt-oriented 
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approach, conceptual metaphor theory offers an ac-
count of how abstract ideas underlying design origi-
nate in non-verbal perceptual and bodily experience.5 
More broadly, embodied cognition—also known as 
grounded cognition and situated cognition—proposes 
that cognition doesn’t exist as an independent sym-
bolic module in the brain, but depends critically on 
the modalities, body, and environment.6 Much like 
Gestalt psychology, cognition emerges as the brain, 
body, and environment coordinate situated action.7 
Analogously, recent theories of emotion argue against 
viewing emotion as an independent brain module, 
proposing instead that affective and cognitive pro-
cesses work closely together.8 Rather than being a 
source of distraction and bias, emotion plays funda-
mentally important roles in cognition.
Interestingly, these three recent developments 
have two things in common. First, they suggest 
that there is more to cognition than symbolic and 
linguistic processing. Instead, cognition depends 
critically on pre-symbolic and pre-verbal experience 
associated with perception, action, the body, and 
affect. Second, they all propose that complex patterns 
across multimodal domains of experience are central 
for cognition. Rather than operating independently of 
one another, perception, cognition, bodily experience, 
and action are tightly coupled, working together to 
produce effective action in the world. To the extent 
that these approaches are onto something, they sug-
gest that design also depends critically on non-sym-
bolic multimodal patterns, something that designers 
learned some time ago from Arnheim.9
What perhaps makes humans as unique and 
powerful as they are, however, is that they combine 
experiential patterns with language and symbolic pro-
cessing.10 Rather than only relying on non-verbal ex-
perience—as do other, non-human animals—humans 
have powerful abilities for articulating, manipulating, 
and expressing these patterns via symbolic and lin-
guistic processing. If we want to understand human 
cognition, we have to understand how these two 
kinds of processes work together. To the extent that 
integrating the experiential and the symbolic consti-
tute the crux of human intelligence, it follows that 
design thinking probably reflects the coupling of ex-
periential and symbolic processes as well. Rather than 
viewing experiential and symbolic approaches as com-
petitors, it makes more sense to view them as comple-
mentary, both essential to explaining the remarkable 
character of human intelligence and behavior.11 
One other classic theoretical tradition from 
cognitive science also has potential for informing 
design—dual-process theories. Since at least William 
James,12 the distinction between implicit habitual 
processes and explicit regulatory processes has been 
used to explain probably all significant phenomena 
studied in the cognitive, social, and affective sci-
ences.13 On the one hand, memories, concepts, and 
knowledge may often become active in relatively un-
conscious and implicit manners to influence design. 
On the other, a wide variety of regulatory and explic-
itly reflective conscious strategies may often regulate 
the immediate design process, and also its long-term 
development. Understanding design as the interaction 
of these two kinds of processes strikes me as another 
potentially fruitful direction to pursue.
As we have seen, insight into design thinking 
often tracks developments in cognitive science. As 
cognitive science develops new insights into human 
intelligence, these insights find their way into ac-
counts of design thinking. Two points follow from 
this observation. First, design thinking could also 
potentially benefit from drawing on other recent 
developments in cognitive science not incorporated 
so far, including the importance of (1) statistical pro-
cessing in connectionism, neural nets, and dynamical 
systems;14 (2) Bayesian inference;15 (3) crowd sourcing 
and big data as illustrated by Latent Semantic Anal-
ysis;16 and (4) neuroscience.17
Each of these perspectives potentially offers 
insight into the design process. From the statistical 
perspective, the design process is not likely to pro-
duce the same design solution to a design problem 
across occasions, but is likely to vary considerably, 
reflecting diverse subtle influences dynamically. From 
the Bayesian perspective, the design process relies 
heavily on habitual solutions (priors), but also reflects 
current contextual constraints (likelihoods). Similarly, 
from the crowd sourcing and big data perspective, the 
design process reflects thousands of relevant design 
and life experiences that simultaneously influence 
behavior. From the neuroscience perspective, the 
design process reflects a variety of intrinsic networks 
associated with attention, control, mind wandering, 
and feeling, as well as other diverse mechanisms 
such as neural reuse, neural plasticity, and processing 
hierarchies that project from topographically mapped 
feature areas to modal and cross-modal association 
areas.
A second point further follows from the observa-
tion that design thinking often tracks developments 
in cognitive science. As future developments continue 
to alter the landscape of cognitive science, they are 
likely to alter the landscape of design thinking as 
well. Because design thinking draws on the full scope 
of cognitive and affective processes in humans, new 
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insights in cognitive science are likely to percolate 
into the design community. Rather than being sur-
prised by the co-evolution of cognitive science and 
design thinking, we should expect it.
In closing, I return to the koan: define design 
thinking. As design thinking incorporates evolving 
perspectives in cognitive science, its apparent nature 
is likely to change when viewed through the explan-
atory lens of each new perspective. A potentially 
interesting question is whether the same process 
simply looks different, or whether it actually changes 
in response to the current lens. Because designers 
often appear consciously motivated to achieve various 
design styles, absorbing current scientific thinking 
about what they’re doing could potentially change 
their design habits via reflective processes (dual-pro-
cess theory). If so, then attempting to define design 
thinking aims to define a moving target. From a 
scientific perspective, this obviously poses significant 
challenges. From the design perspective, however, 
forgetting about definitions and simply being in the 
design process is perhaps what it’s all about. Allow 
new perspectives to reshape one’s thinking, and then 
simply get on with it.
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In their article, Karin Lindgaard and Heico Wesselius1 
have rather courageously set out to link urgent ques-
tions that arise from developments in contemporary 
design thinking to the theories of embodied cognition 
that have emerged within cognitive science over the 
last thirty-odd years—26 years, to be precise, if we 
take the 1991 work entitled The Embodied Mind as the 
landmark publication.2 To do this paper justice and 
provide a thoughtful response to what it sets out to 
achieve, we must take a step back to reflect on the 
journey Lindgaard and Wesselius take us. 
Design research, as a field, tends to base itself 
on fundamental insights from many other academic 
fields. This is quite understandable and commend-
able. Design research needs a strong and consistent 
basis—an appropriate ontology, epistemology, a 
theory of perception, and, as Lindgaard and Wesse-
lius argue, a theory of cognition as lenses that can be 
brought to bear on design. Such specialist academic 
fields have dealt with these fundamental issues at 
length, and as design researchers, we need to learn 
from their insights. Over the years, design researchers 
have become avid borrowers. While there is nothing 
wrong with this in principle, there are four critical 
observations to be made about the way in which this 
done: (1) while design research borrows, it never returns, 
(2) design research cherry-picks, (3) design research jumps 
to conclusions, and (4) design research tends to borrow only 
once. Let’s investigate this borrowing behavior more 
broadly, and then use these four critical reflections 
as a framework to look at Lindgaard and Wesselius’s 
article.
(1) Consider the first point: design research fo-
cuses on designers’ practices, behavior, and thinking. 
To understand these, design researchers use theories 
from Artificial Intelligence (AI), systems thinking, 
psychology, sociology, linguistics, education, and so 
on—yet their research results never seem to question 
the theories that are borrowed from these fields very 
deeply, while new insights generated in the study 
of design are almost never looped back into the aca-
demic discussion about these theories in their parent 
fields. An example could be educational theory. While 
design researchers and educators take concepts from 
didactics and apply those in thinking about design ed-
ucation, the results of these studies tend to be dissem-
inated at conference sessions on design education, 
rather than on the mainstream educational research 
podiums of the world. This will not do—design edu-
cation research should be up to the standards of the 
educational field and be appreciated there. This also 
happens to be a huge missed opportunity. As some 
design practices are now seen as generally applicable 
twenty-first-century skills, educating students in them 
is becoming an urgent issue across all levels of educa-
tion and many professional fields. The design educa-
tion research community must have many valuable 
practices and insights to share beyond the confines of 
its journals and conferences. Perhaps the reason for 
this is a natural modesty—but I fear that is not the 
case. The more likely reason is that design research 
borrows without having a proper overview of the 
field it is borrowing from, and hence it is simply not 
capable of engaging in the intellectual discussion in 
that field. 
(2) Design researchers tend to select the theories 
that they like, or that resonate with their existing 
knowledge of design practices. This, of course, is very 
dangerous. By just selecting what is agreeable, design 
research misses out on the challenges that theories 
from other fields can pose to our current under-
standing of design. Such work might be self-affirming, 
rather than critically engaging with its subject matter. 
It means that design research is merely looking at 
a Rorschach blot in which it sees whatever it wants 
instead of critically studying design. This gives a false 
sense of security and stymies progress. 
(3) That statement neatly segues into the third 
criticism: having borrowed a fundamental theory that 
confirms design researcher’s insights about design, 
design researchers tend to draw far-reaching conclu-
sions for design practice. Imagine that cognitive sci-
entists have discovered how perception works, on the 
level of a split-second interaction between the actor 
and their environment. Surely this insight cannot be 
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